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This Article discusses aspects of the past, present, and future
treatment of mass torts in the Manual for Complex Litigation ("Manual"
or "MCC). The Article develops the following story.
Some lawyers and judges have used the Manual like a treatise. A
danger of such use is that the Manual may discuss a novel concept
simply to encourage innovation and testing. Enshrining an innovative
idea into a rule of law can lead to the premature creation of rigid legal
rules. In the end, such rigidity can inhibit the innovative case man-
agement that the Manual is designed to promote. Mass tort litigation
is exceedingly complex, involving widely differing congregations of
multifaceted cases. A manual, with its inherent tendency to present
rules of thumb, can fall prey to the temptation to oversimplify the fac-
tors thatjudges should consider when deciding, for example, whether
to aggregate a group of tort cases. By presenting alternative, multidi-
mensional approaches, some of which are sketched out in the last Part
of this Article, a manual might avoid prematurely creating rigid rules.
Part I describes the Manual and its evolution. Part II uses the
Manual's treatment of the concept of maturity in mass tort litigation
and one court's reliance on that treatment as a case study to assess the
role the Manual should play in the development of practices, proce-
dures, and legal rules that might be applied to mass torts. Part III pre-
sents a critical evaluation of the maturity concept, examining how ma-
turity would have applied to past and present mass tort congregations,
t* Senior researcher at the Federal Judicial Center, in that capacity, I served as
principal drafter of the mass tort section of the third edition of the Manual for Complex
Litigation and currently serve as staff to the newly appointed Board of Editors for the
Manual The views presented are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Federal Judicial Center or the Board of Editors. I gratefully acknowledge the thor-
ough research assistance of Kristina Gill of George Washington University Law School
and the insightful comments of William W Schwarzer, Russell Wheeler, and Jennifer
Evans Marsh on an earlier draft of this Article.
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challenging the premises underlying the general concept, and analyz-
ing one alternative approach in which maturity would not be isolated
from other factors affecting mass tort case management. Part IV ad-
dresses some of those other factors and considers one alternative for
treating maturity differently in future versions of the ManuaL
I. WHAT Is THE MANUAL FOR COMPLEX L1TIGATIONAND
How HAS IT EVOLVED?
A. A Precursor to the Manual
The Judicial Conference adopted the precursor to the Manua4
entitled Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted
Case ("Handbook"), in March 1960. A special panel of judges, ap-
pointed by ChiefJustice Earl Warren in 1955 to serve as the Judicial
Conference's Study Group on Protracted Litigation, developed the
procedures in the Handbook Working in consultation with leading
trial lawyers, the study group served under the auspices of the Pretrial
Committee of the Judicial Conference chaired by Alfred P. Murrah,
then-ChiefJudge of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Their
mission was to uncover and make accessible to bench and bar the
"great reservoir of experience in the conduct of protracted litigation
accumulated over the years and lying dormant within the legal profes-
sion."2
The Handbook produced by the study group was "designed as a
tool, available for use by... [whomever] chooses to use it."o The
judges in the study group saw the prototypical problem as the "Big
Case," which they identified as an antitrust case, a patent case, or a
case involving high stakes or a large number of parties.4 At the time
the Handbook was written, the judiciary had not yet experienced the
flood of small or medium-sized cases that, when added together, form
the fodder for what we now call mass torts.
The core research method for producing the Handbook was to col-
lect the experiences of judges and lawyers about case management
techniques. The purpose of the Handbook was to pass these experi-
ences along to others who might confront similar "Big Cases."' The
' 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
2 Id. at 355 (Foreword by Judge Alfred P. Murrah).
3 Id. at 359 (Preface by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman).
4Id. at 375. The term "Big Case" is capitalized in the original Handbook.
5 A series of three seminars was held at law schools in the late 1950s. See
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method was experiential in the broad sense that it drew on real, albeit
anecdotal, litigation activity, as opposed to simply published opinions
or other authorities. A reader of the Handbook is more likely to find
footnotes citing discussions at seminars, reports from conferences, or
unpublished case anecdotes, than to find footnotes citing published
opinions.
For the most part, as its title asserts, the Handbook packaged sug-
gestions in the form of recommendations to judges and lawyers.
While the recommendations were presented in bold black letters-
perhaps hinting at or inviting readers to see them as authoritative-
the tone was managerial and for the most part deferential to existing
rules. For example, on the use of special masters, the judges recom-
mended that "[a] protracted case should not, in the absence of
agreement by the parties, be referred in its entirety to a master," but
"a master may perform useful functions, in aid of the assigned judge,
on limited and specified matters such as fact reporting on preliminary
matters, or complicated and involved accountings."' Later, the judges
recommended considering use of a master to supervise discovery in
exceptional cases, and carefully followed case law principles that "spe-
cial masters should not be appointed automatically," nor "utilized as
substitutes for the trial judge."8
Notably, the Handbook's recommendations were posited as "rules"
to govern the "Big Case." The black-letter format and the absence of
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 373 n.1 (citing unpublished proceedings of Seminar held
at University of Colorado School of Law, July 13-15, 1959); Proceedings of the Seminars on
Protracted Cases for the United States Judges Held at the School of Law Stanford University,
Stanford, Cal., Aug. 18-22, 1958, 23 F.R.D. 319 (1958); Proceedings of the Seminar on Pro-
tracted Cases for United States Circuit and District Judges Held at New York University Law Cen-
ter NewYork City, Aug. 26-30, 1957, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1957). Earlier, in 1951, theJudicial
Conference adopted a report issued by a committee ofjudges chaired by Chief Judge
E. Barrett Prettyman of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that
came to be known as the Prettyman Report. SeeHon. Leon R.Yankwich, 'Short Cuts" in
Long Cases: A Commentay on the Report Entitled Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted
Cases Adopted by theJudicial Conference of the United States, Sept. 26, 1951, 18 F.R.D. 41, 62-
84 (1953) (providing the full text of the Report, Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Pro-
tracted Cases).
6 Of the 139 footnotes in the Handbook, 102 references were to reports or seminars.
Sixty-two of these references were to the three seminars described supra note 5, 26
were to the Prettyman Report, supra note 5, and 14 were to two American Bar Associa-
tion committee reports that were first cited in the Handbook at page 373, note 1. In
contrast to the 102 references to reports or seminars, there were 72 references to cases,
many of which had been discussed at the seminars and were unpublished. Many foot-
notes, of course, contained more than one reference.
7 HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 381-82.
8 Id. at 390. These principles are articulated in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352
U.S. 249, 256-59 (1957).
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alternative recommendations imply as much. Clearly the alternative
of doing nothing was not acceptable, and the Handbook did not en-
courage judges to fashion their own approaches.
More often, recommendations in the Handbook did not directly
come into contact with applicable law but rather dealt with discretion-
ary managerial functions. For example, the Handbook recommended:
"When a protracted case is identified, the assigned judge should, at
the earliest moment, take... control of the case."9 More specific rec-
ommendations for taking control of a case-for example, by holding
early pretrial conferences and controlling discovery-were not explic-
itly authorized or prohibited by existing rules.
B. MCL (First Edition)
In 1969, the first edition of the Manua4 prepared by a Board of
Editors specially appointed by the Federal Judicial Center, was pub-
lished under the title Manual for Complex and Multi-District Litigation
("MCL). Congress had created the Center in December 1967 to
"conduct research and study... the operation"10 of the federal courts
and "to stimulate, create, develop, and conduct programs of continu-
ing education and training for personnel of the judicial branch" of
the federal government" For purposes of this Article, it is important
to note that the Center has no authority to take actions that are bind-
ing on the judiciary or on individual judges. Courts and judges, in
other words, are under no legal or administrative obligation to follow
any suggestions they may receive from Center education or research.
When Justice Tom C. Clark, the first director of the Center, ap-
pointed the first Board of Editors, he seized an opportunity for the
Center to address some pressing needs of the courts. As stated in the
foreword to the MCL, the Center's "research and planning will re-
quire time before it affects the operations of the courts.... This Man-
ual is designed to meet some of the current needs of the courts." 2 As
to the intended use and authority of the MCL, the six judges who con-
stituted the Board of Editors adopted Judge Murrah's approach as
stated in the Handbook, that is, that the MCL "'contains neither a sim-
plified outline for the easy disposition of complex litigation nor an in-
9 HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 383.
'o 28 U.S.C. § 620(b) (1) (1994).
Id. § 620(b) (3).
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTI-Drsncr LITIGATION iii (West 1969) [here-
inafter MCL].
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flexible formula or mold into which all trial and pre-trial procedures
must be cast. '"' 3 The procedures are recommended because they are
"'the product of experience and the development of able minds.' 14
In the end, "flexibility should be the keynote in applying the sugges-
tions contained in this Manual."15
The text of the MCa, however, struck a more imperative tone than
the Handbook, and could be read as directing specific procedures and
agendas for each stage of the litigation. For example, the editors as-
serted that "experience has demonstrated that in a complex case orderly
discovery requires that the first wave of discovery be accompanied by
plans for full discovery in two successive waves."16 In a similar tone,
the editors stated that a "crucial step in the first phase of judicial man-
agement of complex cases is the prompt entry of an order staying all pre-
trial proceedings until an initial schedule of discovery is approved. "
17
The text set forth fixed agendas for the First Principal (Preliminary)
Pretrial Conference18 and for the Second Principal Pretrial Confer-
ence.'9 Without commenting on the wisdom of these apparent man-
dates-and without reliable empirical evidence about how frequently
they were followed-one can only say that the Manual presents its
guidance as a set of authoritatively stated procedural guidelines.
Other than the disclaimer in the Foreword, no limitations suggest that
these guidelines should not govern all of the subset of litigation classi-
fied as complex.
The text of the MCL indicates that the authors moved beyond
presenting suggestions for management and sought to influence the
development of the law. For example, the MCL's treatment of survey
samples and opinion polls suggests that the editors were aware that
their text might be used as persuasive authority in interpreting and
expanding the law relating to admissibility of surveys. As one com-
mentator has noted, before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
ls Id. at xix (quoting HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 355). The Manual for Complex
Litigation, Second opens by quoting that same statement. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 10, at 1 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter MCL 2D].
'4 MCL, supra note 12, at xii (quoting HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 355).
Id. at xiii.
16 Id. § 1.7, at 15 (emphasis added).
17 Id. § 1.1, at 11 (emphasis added). As seen in the emphasized words, the MCL
made the specific content and timing of the order unmistakably clear.
'8 See id. § 1.0, at 10.
'9 See id. § 2.0, at 17-18. For example, the MCL instructs that at this conference the
judge should "(a) determine the class action issue, (b) determine preliminary legal
questions, (c) rule on requests for discovery scheduled by the first pretrial conference
(first wave of discovery)," and perform other such functions. Id. at 17.
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dence in 1975, "the question whether surveys constituted acceptable
evidence... was unsettled."2' Doubts about admissibility of surveys
"centered on their use of sampling techniques and their status as
hearsay evidence."2' In 1969, the MCL's black-letter recommendation
on use of samples and polls stated that "[sIcientifically designed sam-
ples and polls, meeting the tests of necessity and trustworthiness, are
useful adjuncts to conventional methods of proof and may contribute
materially to shortening the trial of the complex case."2 The implica-
tion seems clear enough: valid surveys probative of a material fact
should be admitted into evidence. Almost five pages of background
discussion supporting this recommendation put forth arguments for
the admissibility of samples and polls, citing only cases in which such
materials were found to be admissible.2s The discussion noted that
"[t]he principal objection to the admission of both samples and polls
has been that such evidence is hearsay" and concluded that "[ciourts
now admit samples and polls over the hearsay objection on the
grounds that surveys are not hearsay."2 4
20 DAvID L. FAiGMAN ET AL., 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EvIDENCE 187 (1997). A recent
case shows that the admissibility of surveys as evidence is not entirely settled. SeeScher-
ing Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 224-40 (2d Cir. 1999) (reversing and remanding
a decision by the district court to exclude five surveys based on a hearsay objection,
holding that two surveys were admissible under the state of mind exception in Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(3) and that the other surveys were to be reconsidered as to their
trustworthiness and necessity under the residual hearsay rule, Federal Rule of Evidence
807).
21 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 187. For examples of the exclusion of surveys
based on hearsay objections, see Colonficio Italiano Max Meyer, S.P.A. v. S/S Hellenic
Wav4 419 F.2d 223, 225-26 (5th Cir. 1969), and Northern California PharmaceuticalAssln
v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 391 (9th Cir. 1962). For an oft-cited case rejecting hear-
say objections to a properly conducted survey, see Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Im-
ports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 680-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
22 MCL, supra note 12, § 2.612, at 22.
22 See id. at 23-27 (supporting the recommendation in favor of the usefulness and
admissibility of samples and polls).
24 Id. at 2-24. The drafters cited cases from the early 1950s, including one federal
court of appeals case decided in 1951, two district court cases, and one state case. The
court also cited the classic 1963 Zippo case, "a scholarly opinion by Feinberg, J." Id. at
24 n.39. The MCL 2d and the MCL 3d continued to assert that properly-conducted
surveys are admissible, but by the time of their publication, the law had become more
settled because of the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See MCL 2D,
supra note 13, § 21.484, at 88-89 (opining on the usefulness of statistical evidence such
as surveys); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD § 21.493, at 101-03 (1995)
[hereinafter MCL 3D] (same). As observed supra note 20, however, the law is not en-
tirely settled.
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C. MCL 2d
Whatever the intent of the drafters, the MCL came to be perceived
as mandating the rote application of a fixed set of rules. Professor
Francis McGovern, who was instrumental in drafting the Manual for
Complex Litigation, Second ("MCL 2d"), described the MCL as "prescrib-
ing strict guidelines for managing complex cases" and containing
"predetermined rules with universal applicability."2 In contrast, the
MCL 2d was designed to present "a compendium of procedural de-
vices, described in detail, with comments concerning their strengths
and weaknesses."2 6 The result is that each "judge or attorney must de-
cide, on a case-by-case basis, when intervention may be desirable and
which techniques to use on which cases.t4
A Board of Editors, appointed by Center director A. Leo Levin
and chaired by Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., wrote the MCL 2d. It was
published in 1985. The eight editors consisted of six federal district
judges and two federal appellate judges. Professors Arthur R. Miller
and Francis E. McGovern served as "technical advisors."2 The intent
of the editors was to shift away from proscribing and prescribing sin-
gle methods. Instead, they planned to describe a smorgasbord of
choices for judges and attorneys. In the introduction, Judge Pointer
wrote that "[t]he various techniques suggested.., either have been
used regularly with success or deserve, in the opinion of the Board of
Editors, further use and experimentation in appropriate cases.'" 2 In
some instances, "the Manual describes alternative procedures that
may be used in particular cases to cope with the same problem. "' By
presenting options, the editors unmistakably disclaimed any intent to
establish legal precedents or to be cited as authority in the evolution
of procedural law. Nothing deflates a claim to legal authority like an
argument in the alternative.
D. MCL 3d
The Manual for Complex Litigation Third ("MCL 3d"), released in
1995, was written by "staff of the Federal Judicial Center," led by the
2Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litiga-
tion, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 440,448-49 (1986).
Id. at 448.
' I& at 449.
" MCL 2D, supra note 13, at iii.
Id. § 10, at 1.W a.
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Center's then-Director, Judge William W Schwarzer.3 ' I contributed
chapters on mass torts and CERCLA (Superfund) litigation. 2 The
MCL 3d continues the tradition of MCL 2d in presenting alternatives.
It is, in Judge Schwarzer's introductory words, "a kit of management
tools that have proved effective in the past, from which the partici-
pants should select those useful for the particular circumstances.0
3
Judge Schwarzer takes pains to note that the MCL 3d offers "an array
of litigation management techniques" and "does not recommend that
every litigation necessarily use any of them or follow a standard pat-
tem."3 Indeed, in its opening pages, in a section called "Use of the
Manual," the authors expressly disclaim any citation or use of the MCL
3d as legal authority: "The manual is offered as an aid to manage-
ment, not as a treatise on matters of substantive or procedural law....
Nor is the manual intended for citation as authority on points of law
or as a statement of official policy."35
In summary, the Manual appears to have evolved from a set of
recommendations into a series of hard-and-fast rules before settling
into its current format-a menu of alternative approaches to a chang-
ing array of complex litigation. The two most recent editions have
catalogued the latest innovations in case management techniques and
disavowed any aspirations to alter common law or procedural rules.
Given the nonadversarial context in which these editions have been
written-especially the recent reliance on staff-the disclaimer of in-
tent to serve as authority seems to give appropriate deference to ad-
versarial development of common law in concrete cases.
II. THE MANUALAS SOCIALAUTHORrY
"Social authority" is a term that Professors John Monahan and
Laurens Walker coined to describe the use of an empirical proposi-
tion as the equivalent of a legal rule.6 Monahan and Walker propose
that, before adopting empirical findings, courts should examine them
to assure the validity and stability of the scientific underpinnings for
", MCL 3D, supra note 24, at xiv.
-2 See id.
Id. § 10.1, at 4.
Id.
Id. § 10.2, at 5.
John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating; and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (1986) (arguing that
"courts should treat social science research relevant to creating a rule of law as a source
of authority rather than as a source of facts").
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such findings 7 This Part uses a case study to illustrate how one
court's use of the MCL 3d might be construed as regarding the Man-
ualas social authority without satisfying the criteria that Monahan and
Walker posit. The result of using the Manual to formulate legal rules
may be that inflexible rules will inhibit judicial case management in
fast-changing areas such as mass tort litigation.
The MCL 2d was the first in the series of manuals to include a
chapter on the application of complex litigation principles to the
emerging field of what we now call "mass torts."ss A chapter on "Mass
Disasters and Other Complex Tort Cases" consisted of thirteen pages
covering seven topics: "Centralized Management," "Organization of
Counsel," "Parties and Issues," "Class Actions," "Discovery," "Trial,"
and "Settlements."3 9 Reflecting the times, class actions were covered
in a single paragraph that began "[hleeding the caveat of the Advisory
Committee, courts historically have been reluctant to authorize class ac-
tion treatment of personal injury claims arising from a mass disaster or
from discrete uses of, or exposure to, a product at different locations
and times."40 The chapter goes on to say that "use of Rule 23 is not
necessarily impermissible in all mass tort litigation" and that "[c]ourts
have only recently begun to consider the propriety of forming a class
under Rule 23(b) (1) and (b) (2) in the mass tort context."4' Note that
the discussion summarizes the experiences of the courts in applying
class action rules to mass torts, and presents both the emerging ex-
perimentation with class actions and the traditional limits.
Ten years later, in 1995, reflecting the burst of mass tort activity
including class action litigation that had taken place in the prior dec-
ade, the MCL 3d expanded the coverage of mass torts considerably2
The subsection on class actions shifts from heeding the caveat against
class actions and begins: "Despite the Advisory Committee's 1966 caveat,
courts have increasingly utilized class actions to avoid duplicative liti-
gation in mass tort cases, although primarily in the context of settle-
ment."4 Again, the presentation discusses the recent experience of
courts and indicates that settlement may be a differentiating and limit-
7See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
"3 See MOL 2D, supra note 13, § 33.2, at 291-303 (discussing "Mass Disasters and
Other Complex Tort Cases").
39 See i.
4 Id. § 33.24, at 298 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).41 id,
42 See MCL 3D, supra note 24, § 33.2, at 308-34 (discussing management of and pro-
cedures for handling mass tort cases).
Id. at 324 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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ing factor.4
In addition to class certification, consolidation represents a sec-
ond procedure for aggregating claims. The MCL 3d discusses these
two procedures together, after cautioning that "aggregation, whether
through consolidation or class action treatment, may not be appropri-
ate for some litigation."4 The MCL 3d goes on to introduce the con-
cept of maturity in positive but probabilistic terms: "In general, those
mass torts in which general causation has become relatively clear over
time are likely to be candidates for large consolidations or even class
action treatment."4 In a footnote, the MCL 3d indicates that
"[e]mpirical research suggests that decisions to consolidate or bifur-
cate trials may affectjury decisions about liability and damages," citing
experimental research findings by social psychologists Kenneth Bor-
dens and Irwin Horowitz. 47
Despite the Manuals coverage, judges and lawyers have not typi-
cally managed mass tort litigation by consulting manuals. While
judges and lawyers facing a massive and novel set of cases may have
used the MCL 3d as an introductory source of ideas, they have con-
trolled mass tort litigation by fashioning case management tools
adapted to the characteristics and needs of each unique group of
cases. The case study that follows does not appear to represent a
4 Soon after publication of the MCL 3d, however, a rapid succession of federal ap-
pellate and United States Supreme Court decisions restricted the role of class actions
in resolving mass torts in litigation contexts, including settlement. See Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (decertifying a national Rule 23(b) (3) settlement
class of present and future asbestos claimants); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97
F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) (vacating national certification under Rule 23(b) (3) and
(c) (4) as to liability issues of a class of users of a drug to treat epilepsy); Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a national Rule
23(b) (3) litigation class of nicotine-dependent cigarette smokers); In re American
Medical Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a national Rule 23(b) (3)
litigation class involving penile prostheses users); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51
F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting mandamus and directing the district court to de-
certify a national Rule 23(b) (3) and 23(c) (4) litigation class of HIV-infected hemo-
philiacs as to issues of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty). This trend continues.
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999) (decertifying a Rule
23 (b) (1) limited fund settlement class of present and future asbestos claimants).
4 MCL 3D, supra note 24, § 33.26, at 322.
46 Id.
4 Id. § 33.26, at 322 n.1056 (citing Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass
Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact ofProcedural Changes onjuiy Decisions, 73JUDICATURE 22
(1989)).
4See generally Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80
CORNE.L L. REv. 941, 948-50 (1995) (emphasizing the evolution of the mass torts sys-
tem resulting from selection byjudges and other policymakers among competing insti-
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widespread or even typical use of the MCL 3d. The study is a vivid ex-
ample of the limits of a manual, illustrating that material designed to
encourage innovation can become prematurely rigidifled into a rule
of law.
In one post-1995 case restricting the role of class actions in resolv-
ing mass tort litigation, the MCL 3d played a notable role. In Castano
v. American Tobacco Co., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit de-
certified a class of up to 50 million tobacco smokers on a number of
grounds.4 9 This Article discusses the court's use of the maturity con-
cept, but does not discuss the Castano court's independent analysis of
Rule 23 factors, such as the predominance of common issues or as-
pects of superiority unrelated to the maturity of the underlying claims.
The court's conclusion that the putative class should not have been
certified as a litigation class is cogent. The court's treatment of matur-
ity and the consequences of focusing on that single factor is less con-
vincing.
As an independent ground for decertifying the class, the Castano
court addressed the issue of whether "a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." ° That inquiry, by its terms, invites a comparative analy-
sis of case management options. Examining the Manual as a source of
information about alternatives, as the Castano court did, follows natu-
rally from the language of Rule 23. While the court in analyzing the
superiority of the class action approach discussed factors other than
maturity, its summary and conclusion suggest that the court saw itself
as holding, or at least creating a presumption, that immature mass
torts may not be certified as a class under Rule 23(b)(3)!'
tutional designs); Thomas WilIging et al., Individual Characteristics of Mass Torts Case
Congregations [hereinafter Willging et al., Individual Characteristics], in ADVISORY COMM.
ON CIVIL RuLEs & WORKING GRouP ON MASS TORTS, REPORT ON MASS TORT
LMrIGATION app. D (1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION] (examin-
ing the characteristics of 50 mass tort cases over a period of almost 50 years in an at-
tempt to identify possible patterns).
49 84 F.3d at 746-48 (finding not only that the class failed to meet the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites, but also that the class failed to meet the Rule 23(b) (3) superiority re-
quirement).
" FED. R. CrV. P. 23(b) (3); see also Castano, 84 F.3d at 746-51 (analyzing the class in
terms of Rule 23(b) (3)'s superiority requirement). One might read the court's ruling
as subsuming all of the class action discussion under the conclusion that the district
court abused its discretion in certifying a class. The court of appeals, however, ex-
pressly ruled that "[i] n addition to the reasons given above.., this class must be decer-
tified because it independently fails the superiority requirement of rule 23(b) (3)." Id.
at 746.
3' Although the court considered other factors, the maturity of the litigation was
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The court appears to have used the Manual as persuasive author-
ity,52 or at least as a type of what Professors Laurens Walker and John
Monahan have come to call social authority, which, as noted above, is
a shorthand term for empirical propositions that have been tested and
accepted as the equivalent of legal rules.3 As we will see below, the
Castano use of the Manual relies in part on scientifically developed
empirical information and in part on the general experience and
judgment of the authors of the Manualss
The Castano court ruled, as an independent reason for decertify-
ing the class, that because "the tort is immature, the class complaint
must be dismissed."5 The court began its Rule 23 superiority re-
quirement analysis by stating that "certification dramatically affects
the stakes for defendants. "-s To support that proposition, the court
cited the Agent Orange cas 5 7 and the MCL 3d.s Both the Manual and
the Bordens and Horowitz study are cited for the proposition that
"[a]iggregation of claims also makes it more likely that a defendant
will be found liable and results in significantly higher damage awards,"
a proposition that focuses on one aspect of Bordens's and Horowitz's
multifaceted empirical study. 9 After reviewing some history of Rule
the only factor referred to by the court in its summary of its ruling on superiority. See
Castano, 84 F.3d at 740-41 ("[W]hile the tort is immature, the class complaint must be
dismissed as class certification cannot be found to be a superior method of adjudica-
tion."). In its discussion of superiority, the court also considered whether "individual
lawsuits [were] feasible," id., at 748, the "complexity of the choice of law inquiry," id at
749-50, and the "Seventh Amendment limitations to bifurcation," Ud. at 751.
s See id. at 748-49 (citing the Manual in its discussion of"immature" torts).
See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the idea of equating em-
pirical propositions to legal rules).
54 See discussion infra at notes 69-75 and accompanying text (commenting on "leg-
islative factfinding"). One commentator remarked that by citing a source cited in the
Manual, "the [Castano] court makes one authority appear as two, in the kind of im-
maculate conception of which law reviews are sometimes guilty." John Burritt
McArthur, The Class Action Tool in Oilfeld Litigation, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 113, 201 n.528
(1996).
-' Castano, 84 F.3d at 740-41.
6 1d. at 746.
57 See id. ("Class certification magnifies and strengthens the number of unmeritori-
ous claims." (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165-66 (2d
Cir. 1987))).
"See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746.
Id. (citing MCL 3D, supra note 24, § 33.26, at 322 n.1056, and Kenneth S. Bor-
dens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of Procedural Changes on
Juiy Decisions, 73JUDICATuRE 22, 22 (1989)). As noted above, the statement in the text
of the MCL 3d is that "[e]mpirical research suggests that decisions to consolidate or
bifurcate trials may affect jury decisions about liability and damages." MCL 3D, supra
note 24, § 33.26, at 322 n.1056. While Bordens and Horowitz found deleterious effects
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23, its Advisory Committee Note,60 and Judge Posner's analysis of su-
61periority in Rhone-Pouenc, the court concluded its analysis with this
quote from the MCL 3d.
Fairness may demand that mass torts with few prior verdicts or judg-
ments be litigated first in smaller units-even single-plaintiff, single-
defendant trials--until general causation, typical injuries, and levels of
damages become established. Thus, "mature" mass torts like asbestos or
Dalkon Shield may call for procedures that are not appropriate for in-
cipient mass tort cases, such as those involving injuries arising from new• ° 62
products, chemical substances, or pharmaceuticals.
The MCL 3d cites a law review article by Professor McGovern for
that maturity concepto but the Castano court cited only the ManuaL
Although the court may have simply been economical in its citations,
the exclusive citation appears to attribute more authoritative force to
for defendants, as cited by the court, their findings are not as one-sided as the court's
statement indicates. These researchers also found that "the plaintiff with the most se-
vere injuries ... received higher awards in the context of an individual trial [than in an
aggregated trial]." Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation..
The Impact of Procedural Changes onJuy Dedsions 73 JUDICATURE 22, 24 (1989) [herein-
after Bordens & Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation]. Given that finding, the Castano
court's concern that a defendant could face significantly higher damage awards in the
aggregated condition might not bejustified. If the percentage of severe cases is high
enough, plaintiffs as a whole might recover higher awards through plaintiff-by-plaintiff
litigation.
Moreover, in their complete report of the above study, Horowitz and Bordens re-
ported that the presence in a consolidation of a plaintiff with severe injuries made it
more likely that the jury would find for the defendants. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Ken-
neth S. Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of
Plaintiffs on Simulated CivilJuiy Decisions, 12 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 209, 225 (1988) [here-
inafter Horowitz & Bordens, OutlierPresence] (noting that having a plaintiff with severe
injuries in a consolidated action resulted in more verdicts for the defendants, although
one would expect it to have the opposite effect). Where the severely injured plaintiff is
not included-as in plaintiff-by-plaintiff litigation-the research suggests that it is more
likely that ajury would find defendants liable in a given case. See id. ("In some juries
the very severity of the outlier's injuries appeared to raise a question of fault, in that
doubt may have been cast on whether the company could be so venal as to cause such
injuries in pursuit of profit."). In the end, these research findings do not fully support
the Castano court's interpretation and reliance on them.
'0 See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746-47 nn.19 & 23 (citing the Advisory Committee's Note
cautioning against certification of a class for mass accidents).
61 In reRhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
62 Castano, 84 F.3d at 748-49 (quoting MCL 3D, supra note 24, § 33.26, at 322).
0' See MCL 3D, supra note 24, § 33.26, at 822 n.1057 ("Litigation is 'mature' if
through previous cases (1) discovery has been completed, (2) a number of verdicts
have been received indicating the value of claims, and (3) plaintiffs' contentions have
been shown to have merit." (citing Francis E. McGovern, Issues in Civil Procedure: Ad-
vancing the Dialogue, A Symposium: Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L REV.
659 (1989))).
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the Manual than I or the editors of the Manual intended or would
have expected.
The Castano court appears to have used the MCL 3d as persuasive
authority. As we have seen, the MCL 3d specifically disclaimed any use
as an authority,64 and by using the term "may," implicitly disclaimed
treatment of maturity as authority.6 The court's use raises some un-
settling questions addressed below.
" Is the empirical component of the Manual, both in the form of
anecdotal accumulations ofjudicial experiences and of citation to
empirical research findings, a type of social authority that should
be used to establish the empirical foundation for a rule of law?
* What process should precede a finding of social authority and
what standards should be used to evaluate putative social author-
ity?
* How does the addition of a concept like maturity to Rule 23 relate
to the rulemaking process established pursuant to the Rules Ena-
bling Act?6
Ultimately, these questions lead to one final question: Can general
and conclusory concepts like maturity be presented in publications
like the Manual in a way that lessens the likelihood that they will be
converted into legal rules?
A. Legislative Factfinding
In creating a procedural rule or presumption that only mature
mass tort cases are eligible for certification as class actions, the Castano
court relied on at least two empirical premises, both addressed in the
MCL 3& The first is that aggregation of claims is harmful to defen-
dants, for which the court cites (and overstates) social science findings
summarized in the MCL 3&67 The second premise is that immature
mass torts are not appropriate subjects for aggregation.6s The latter
proposition rests solely on the judgment of the authors of the MCL
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Manuas dis-
claimer).
' See Castano, 84 F.3d at 748-49 (citing the MCL 3d's proposition that "fairness may
demand" that immature torts be litigated in smaller units (emphasis added)).
66 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994).
67 See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746 (discussing how aggregation significantly raises the
stakes for defendants); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing re-
search findings on the effects of aggregation on plaintiffs and defendants).
"8 See Castano, 84 F.3d at 740-41, 748-49 (declaring that immature mass torts are
unsuitable for certification).
CASE MANAGEMENT iN THE MCL
3d-qualified by use of the "may"-and the experiences and law re-
view articles that informed thatjudgment.
Both of the above propositions fit within the category of legislative
facts, that is, facts "which have relevance to legal reasoning and the
lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or
ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body."69
Adjudicative facts, on the other hand, are "simply the facts of the par-
ticular case."70 As legislative facts, neither of the above premises are
subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, which outlines the proce-
dures for taking judicial notice. "No rule deals with judicial notice of
'legislative facts,'" according to the Advisory Committee.:' To encour-
age judges to think about the factual premises underlying an issue in
question, the Advisory Committee decided that it would be inappro-
priate to impose "any limitation in the form of indisputability, any
formal requirements of notice other than those already inherent in
affording opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging briefs,
and any requirements of formal findings at any level."7 In keeping
with that rationale, a court faced with the need to decide a case may
take judicial notice of a legislative fact without attending to the for-
malities of judicial notice and without finding the "fact" to be beyond
dispute.n
Using the best available empirical information in a fast-changing
field such as mass torts carries the risk of prematurely solidifying a
procedural rule on the basis of information that has not been tested
in either the adversarial or the legislative rulemaking processes. Pro-
fessor Davis, along with some other commentators, has questioned
whether unfettered judicial notice is the most appropriate approach
69 FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note; see also Kenneth Gulp Davis, An
Approach to Problems ofEvidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REV. 364, 404-07
(1942) (describing the Supreme Court's utilization of legislative facts to inform their
legislativejudgment on issues relating to law and policy).
70 FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's notes.
71Ia
7 Id. The Committee quotes, with approval, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis's
statement: "What the law needs at its growing points is more, not less, judicial thinking
about the factual ingredients of problems of what the law ought to be, and the needed
facts are seldom 'clearly' indisputable." Id. (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, A System ofJu-
dicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPECTIrEs OF LAW 69 (Roscoe
Pound etal. eds., 1964)).
Cf FED. R. EVID. 201(b), which limits judicial notice of an adjudicative fact to
"one not subject to reasonable dispute." In addition, an adjudicative fact must be ei-
ther "generally known" or "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Id.
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to the finding of legislative facts.74 Davis advocates thatjudges become
fully informed about factual premises that support legal rules, while
recognizing that a legislative or rulemaking forum may be superior to
a judicial forum for finding legislative facts.75 In other words, Davis
supports using the rulemaking process as the primary vehicle for re-
solving questions of legislative fact. The implicit criticism of the judi-
cial forum seems to be that any single judge might uncover less than a
complete picture of the social science findings or, in the maturity ex-
ample, the underlying patterns of litigation activity.
In the Castano ruling on maturity, the sources themselves may not
be mature. Social science's study of the effects of aggregation remains
quite young and active. Whether a single maturation cycle applies to
all mass torts has not been determined. 76 The Castano court relied on
a single social science study for its empirical finding on the disadvan-
tages of class actions for defendants. Further studies are in process
that may or may not replicate the findings of that single study.
7
For its conclusion on the maturity factor, the court drew on a
74 See, e.g., KENNETH GULp DAVIS & ca-amD J. PraacE, JR., 2 ADmm 'snTv LAw
TREATrSE § 10.5, at 146-47 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining that adjudicative facts frequently
do not provide an accurate picture of the aggregate of the situation). Commenting on
a case involving the question of whether being younger than age 40 was a bona fide
occupational qualification for a bus driver, Professors Davis and Pierce conclude that
"[t]he legal system is out of gear in committing to a single judge the question whether
safetyjustifies barring those over age 40 from becoming bus drivers. Obviously, the
proper governmental mechanism for determining any such question is a rulemaking
proceeding." Id. at 149.
75 See id. (explaining that a rulemaking proceeding is the appropriate mechanism,
but that if a court must decide such an issue, scientific studies, analyses, and the posi-
tions of relevant administrative agencies should be considered).
76 To get a sense of the variety of mass torts, see generally Willging et al., Individual
Characteristics, supra note 48 (presenting summary information about 50 distinct sets of
mass tort cases).
See Interview with Irwin Horowitz, Professor, Oregon State University (June 16,
1999). One study appears to have replicated part of the earlier study and, at the same
time, to have complicated the issue. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The
Consolidation of Plaintiffs and the Limits of Jurors' Cognitive Proficiencies (1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (using mock repetitive stress injury
("RSI") trials and finding that the defendant was more likely to be found liable as the
number of aggregated plaintiffs increased to a peak of 10, and that damages increased
to a peak of four plaintiffs and were lower per plaintiff when 10 plaintiffs' cases were
aggregated). As with the previous study, the benefits and burdens of aggregation seem
to be distributed among plaintiffs and defendants. See supra note 59 (explaining that
the Castano court's concern that the burden of aggregation is solely on the defendant
is unwarranted, and that Horowitz and Bordens have shown that when a severely in-
jured plaintiff is present in a consolidation, a finding for the defendants is more
likely).
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manual based primarily on the judgment of its authors. While the
text of the Manual was submitted for outside review,78 its recommen-
dations had not been subjected to adversarial challenge in the context
of specific litigation before Castano.9 The district court did not cite
the mass tort chapter of the Manual in the main text of its opinion on
class certification.80 In addition, the Manual is a snapshot of knowl-
edge, fixed in time, about a fast-changing field. Taking judicial notice
of recommendations in the Manual risks missing major changes pub-
lished--or discovered but not published-after 1995.
B. Social Authority Applied
As we have seen, evidentiary rules regarding judicial notice pro-
vide little or no guidance for a judge who conscientiously seeks reli-
able support in crafting common law rules.8 Professors Monahan and
Walker offer a model designed to fill that vacuum.3 They approach
the question of legislative factfinding by concentrating on the use of
social science findings by courts. Their discussion, however, seems
equally applicable to using conclusory statements derived from the
Manual
Monahan and Walker make explicit Davis's implicit criticism of
having a single judge determine legislative facts based on a single
study, and they propose explicit criteria for evaluating social science.
They conclude that "[c] ourts should place confidence in a piece of
scientific research to the extent that the research (1) has survived the
critical review of the scientific community; (2) has employed valid re-
search methods; (3) is generalizable to the case at issue; and (4) is
supported by a body of other research. ' Monahan and Walker pub-
78 An earlier version of the mass tort chapter as well as other portions of the Man-
ual were reviewed and discussed at a conference at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School on May 13, 1994.
Appellants quoted the Manual in the rebuttal portion of their oral argument in
Castano. Record at 64-65, Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-30725). In general, the arguments addressed the subject of maturity
only in the sense of whether the claims in the case were novel, which appellants as-
serted, see id at 4, 7-8, 14, 21, or traditional fraud claims, asappellees asserted, see id. at
28-29.
8' See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84
F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
8' See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (explaining that the evidentiary
rules do not deal with legislative facts, and that the judicial system is ill equipped to
deal with empirical data relating to issues of policy).
"SeeMonahan &Walker, supra note 36, at 495-517.
83 Id. at 499.
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lished the above criteria in 1986, yet their approach is strikingly simi-
lar to the standards the Supreme Court developed in 1993 in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmauceuticals, Inc. to govern the admissibility of scien-
tiflc evidence.8 Presumably the threshold for using scientific informa-
tion to create a rule of law or a presumption would not be lower than
the threshold for admitting scientific information into evidence in a
single case.
How do the above criteria apply to the social science findings used
in the Manual and in the Castano opinion? Innovative and rigorous as
it may be, the Bordens and Horowitz study does not satisfy the above
criteria. Indeed, it would be unusual for any single study to do so. No
doubt the work passed muster in the scientific community; the prestig-
ious and peer-reviewed National Science Foundation funded ite and a
peer-reviewed journal published it.8 Both the funding and the peer-
reviewed publication confirm that the authors employed valid re-
search methods.
The Bordens and Horowitz study, however, did not meet Walker
and Monahan's third and fourth criteria. It was a single study!s7 Al-
though it was a seminal article in a new area, it had not been repli-
cated at the time Castano was decided8e Nor, for many reasons, was
this single study generalizable to the tobacco litigation or, without fur-
ther analysis, to any other mass tort litigation. The experimental study
dealt with a "prototypical toxic tort case" in which hypothetical plain-
tiffs had been exposed to a toxic substance by a chemical manufac-
84 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993). Compare, for example, the Monahan and Walker cri-
teria with the concerns expressed in Daubert about whether a scientific finding has
been (1) subjected to peer review and publication, (2) found to be susceptible to test-
ing by scientific methods, (3) found to be reliable, and (4) generally accepted by the
relevant scientific community. See id. at 593-95 (setting forth these factors as observa-
tions, but not as a conclusive test).
85 See Bordens & Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation, supra note 59, at 24 n.15 ("This
research... was supported by a National Science Foundation Grant SES 8609892.").
The study was published in Law and Human Behavior. See id. at 24 n.14 (noting
that the work was published in Horowitz & Bordens, OutlierPresence, supra note 59).
7 Cf McArthur, supra note 54, at 201 n.528 (criticizing the Castano court's "poor
use of social science"). In commenting on the Castano court's use of social science,
particularly the Bordens & Horowitz study, McArthur remarks that "[n]o social scien-
tist, including the authors, would view their study alone as enough support for chang-
ing the class-action rule." Id.
's A recent study appears to have replicated parts of the earlier study. See generally
Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 77 (showing that increasing the number of plaintiffs
makes it more likely that the defendants will be found liable for increased damages up
to a point, and that the burdens of aggregation are not solely on the defendants).
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turer.& Whether lessons from that type of scenario might apply to
other products, such as tobacco, and other claims, such as fraud and
intentional manipulation of addictive substances, seems questionable.
The issues involved in the experimental study differ significantly from
the issues raised in tobacco litigation. Those differences need to be
analyzed before a court applies findings from a laboratory experiment
to real litigation." Parts III and IV develop a parallel point that is cen-
tral to this Article: each group of mass tort cases has distinguishing
'characteristics that argue against applying a single general concept-
in this case maturity-across the board.
Use of case management suggestions from the Manual also runs
the risk of bypassing the deliberative rulemaking process created by
Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.9' While Castano was being de-
cided, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules considered whether a
maturity factor should be applied to determine the viability of a puta-
tive class action.! A proposed draft published shortly after Castano
proposed adding to the terms of the current Rule 23(b) (3) (B) the
"maturity of any related litigation involving class members" as another
factor for courts to use in determining the superiority of any putative
class action, not just a mass torts action.!3 The Committee received a
considerable number of comments from attorneys, bar organizations,
and private entities.9 Most of the commentators supported adding
the maturity factor, but almost half suggested refining or limiting the
scope of the proposal.95 The proposal was not adopted, but remains
8' Horowitz & Bordens, OutlierPresence, supra note 59, at 214; see also McArthur, su-
pra note 54, at 201 n.528 ("[T]he case may not even be largely representative of real,
tried cases.").
' See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
9' See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994) (codifying the Rules Enabling Act and describ-
ing the rulemaking process).
See 1 RULES COMM. SUPPORT OFFICE, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADviSORY COMM=TTE ON CrvL RULES ON PROPOSED
A ENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 55-56 (1997) (Feb. 1996 Draft) [hereinafter RULE
23 WORKING PAPERS]. The proposed maturity factor is in Rule 23 (b) (3) (C).
93 Id. at 143-44, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 523, 559 (1996) (August 1996 Draft Pub-
lished for Public Comment) (underlined terms indicate the proposed changes). The
proposal would also renumber Rule 23(b) (3) (B) to become Rule 23(b) (3) (C). See id.
at 151 (Committee Note to August 1996 draft) (noting the change in formatting of
Rule 23).
' See i& at 325-29 (featuring comments from the ABA, Public Citizen Litigation
Group, various state bar associations, and others).
9- See id. (discussing how to limit or to refine maturity by setting forth a more lucid
definition, restricting its application to certain kinds of actions, and assuring that ma-
turity considerations will not impede class actions). For example, several attorneys and
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under consideration as of the writing of this Article. If a mass tort
committee is appointed, as recommended by the Mass Tort Working
Group,96 that committee might also consider the proposal.
Using the Manual to reach a result that the Advisory Committee
considered but did not adopt bypasses the Rules Enabling Act process
that Congress established as the mechanism for altering the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Supreme Court recently concluded,
courts "are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its
adoption, and... are not free to alter it except through the process
prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act."97 When the issue
being litigated is precisely the same as an amendment being consid-
ered by the Advisory Committee, an individual court has no authority
to make that change through adjudication.98
An argument might be made that the Advisory Committee is only
making explicit what is already implicit in Rule 23(b) (3)'s prerequi-
site that a court find that "a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."
As I mentioned before,'09 the superiority requirement invites a court
organizational commentators suggested that the maturity concept be limited to causa-
tion questions that are susceptible to scientific proof and not applied to torts involving
novel claims of fraud or to securities or antitrust cases. See id. at 325 (Comments of
Stuart Savett, Nat'l Ass'n. of Sec. & Commercial Attorneys) (limiting maturity to claims
in which "the element of causation is susceptible to scientific proof'); id. at 328 (testi-
mony of David Weinstein) (noting that maturity could have an adverse effect on anti-
trust and securities cases). A law professor suggested that the Committee look to the
MCL 3d for a definition of maturity- "[miaturity is established when prior litigation
shows plaintiffs' claims have merit.... [A] number of courts have picked up on that.
And I think that derives from Professor McGovern's research and writing back some
years ago." 3 RULE 23 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 92, at 162 (Public Hearing, Dallas,
Tex., Dec. 16, 1996) (testimony of Prof. Bart McGuire).
See REPORT ON MASS TORT LIfIGATiON, supra note 48, at 56, reprinted in 187
F.R.D. 293, 319 ("[T]he Civil Rules Advisory Committee has developed and continues
to consider a draft Rule 23 amendment that would emphasize the need to consider
maturity as a class-certification factor.").
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2322 (1999).
"See T. Dean Malone, Castano v. American Tobacco Co. and Beyond.: The Propriety
of Cediying Nationwide Mass-Tort Class Actions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
When the Basis of the Suit Is a "Novel" Claim or Injury, 49 BAYLOR L. REv. 817, 837 (1997)
(arguing that the maturity conceptadds another factor to Rule 23(b) (3)); see also Peter
A. Drucker, Class Certiffication and Mass Torts: Are "Immature" Tort Claims Appropriate for
Class Action Treatment, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 213, 216 (1998) (arguing that "Rule 23
should be amended to forbid certification of 'immature' tort claims," and citing Eisen
v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) for the proposition that the current
Rule 23 bars examination of the merits-and consideration of maturity-before decid-
ing class certification).
FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(b) (3).
10 See discussion supra notes 50-51.
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to consider a wide range of case management factors, including ma-
turity. Where better to look than at a manual that is designed to in-
form case management decisions? The language of Rule 23, however,
directs a court to compare alternative approaches.!0 Establishing a
flat rule or even a presumption that immature mass torts may not be
certified as class actions exceeds Rule 23's terms.le
Upon analysis it appears that empirical statements in the Manual
should not-unless updated by expert evidence or, at least, adversarial
arguments-be used to support creation of a new rule of law. Absent
adversarial presentation, the new rule, whether procedural or substan-
tive, may rest on a faulty or shifting empirical premise. Even after an
adversarial development of the legal and empirical questions, when
the proposed rule is procedural, summary adoption of Manual rec-
ommendations bypasses the rulemaking process. These conclusions
suggest that the drafters of the Manual may want to examine alterna-
tive ways to address the concept of maturity. We now turn to that dis-
cussion.
III. MATuRiYIN MAss TORT LITIGATION
This Part restates the concept of maturity as used in the mass torts
case management literature and tests its universality. It concludes that
using maturity to determine whether or not to aggregate sets of mass
tort cases is both underinclusive and overinclusive; immature mass
torts have sometimes been aggregated successfully, and mature mass
torts have not always been aggregated. This Part then summarizes
other critiques of applying maturity to mass tort aggregation deci-
sions. This lays the groundwork for the multidimensional approach
presented in Part IV.
State-of-the-art mass torts case management can be summarized as
follows: "Different judicial strategies should be used at different
stages of the life cycle." 03 Specifically, in the early stages of a given
litigation set, judges should employ a traditional approach, which is to
"view each case discretely, thus ignoring the effects of cases on one
'01 See FED. R. Cry. P. 23(b) (3) (requiring a finding "that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy").
' See Malone, supra note 98, at 835 ("Opponents of class certification depart from
the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b) (3) when they argue
that the tort must be 'mature' before certification.").103 Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts forJudges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821,
1841 (1995) [hereinafter McGovern, Mass Torts forJudges].
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another.' 0 4 At the later stages, "once the full dimensions of the tort
are recognized, a more activist model is appropriate."05
To implement the above approach, a judge would "learn all as-
pects of the litigation and develop a comprehensive management plan
to resolve the cases in an orderly manner."1s This should occur only
after the litigation has reached a level of maturity in which "a rough
equilibrium of case values ensues as the cases become more routinized
and the parties' contentions become more defined."
107
Professor McGovern has outlined a four-step process for resolving
mass torts that have reached maturity. His proposal directly addresses
defendants' expressed need for a way to end the litigation and also
presents ways of treating future claimants fairly. The steps are: (1)
consolidating all cases of a single mature mass tort into one forum;
(2) resolving all common issues in that forum; (3) collecting informa-
tion concerning all injuries; and (4) developing a systematic process
for resolving all remaining issues. 8
To clarify and evaluate the above case management recommenda-
tions it may help to divide them into two core propositions: First, that
immature mass torts should never be aggregated; second, that mature
mass torts should always be aggregated. One might add some qualifi-
ers such as "generally" or "except for pretrial management," but the
contrast of examining both an absolute prohibition and an absolute
mandate helps focus the debate.
A. Immature Mass Torts
Positing the first recommendation as a general rule helps illumi-
nate its limits and calls attention to the need for special exceptions
and qualifiers. In the end, this exercise leads to the conclusion that
decisions about whether and when to aggregate are multifaceted and
cannot be determined by maturity alone. In examining maturity, this
Part will identify some arguably relevant factors that are shunted aside
by giving the maturity factor exclusive or even primary weight.
In fact, immature mass torts have been aggregated. Products li-
,o4 Id. at 1840.
'05 Id. at 1842.
6 Id. at 1840.
107 Id at 1843.
0s See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659, 690-94 (1989) (discussing how those steps will reduce transaction costs without
sacrificing the individualized treatment and intangible values associated with existing
civil procedure).
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ability cases involving Agent Orange, albuterol, and felbatol were ag-
gregated into class actions, leading to settlements before any individ-
ual verdicts were on record.'9 All three sets of cases had been certi-
fied as litigation class actions.1 Agent Orange cases settled on an opt-
out basis on the eve of trial;' albuterol settled after forty-two days of
trial;112 and felbatol settled after a class certification -was vacated and
remanded by the court of appeals." s For practical purposes, these set-
tlements disposed of the entire litigation. In addition, the first major
settlement in the breast implant litigation took place when that litiga-
tion was, in the judgment of at least one commentator, relatively im-
mature."4
That mass torts have been certified as class actions does not, of
course, mean that they should have been certified. These examples
only show that the point is debatable and that experience does not di-
rect us toward a general conclusion that class certification is never ap-
propriate for a mass tort. A flat rule or presumption against certifying
class actions in immature mass tort litigation would have prevented
the aggregation that seemed to make these national settlements pos-
sible or, some may argue, necessary.
One could argue, as some have with regard to Agent Orange
and silicone gel breast implants, 6 that class settlements of immature
mass torts are not a good idea, because there is insufficient informa-
tion upon which to calculate fair settlement values. One should note,
however, that these arguments relate to data about the number of
claimants, information not directly related to the outcomes of indi-
vidual trials. As to information about case values, one could counter
that experienced lawyers are competent to determine realistic case
109 SeeWiliging et al., Individual Characteristics, supra note 48, at 5-6, 13-14, 28-30, 71-
73 (discussing the individual characteristics of each of these mass tort cases).
"o See id at 13, 28, 71.
.. See U at 5, 13-14.
1' See i& at 71 (describing settlement details).
"s See idi at 28 ("After the class certification was vacated and remanded, the par-
ties... settled more than 200 individual cases.").
"4 SeeJAYTIDMARSH, MASS TORT SETILEMENT CLASS ACTIONS 11 (Federal Judicial
Center 1998) (classifying breast implant cases as "relatively immature").
"5 One participant in the Agent Orange settlement negotiations recalled that, on
the eve of settlement, "'nobody really knew what the real numbers were.'" PETER H.
ScHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 162 (1986) (quoting Benton Musslewhite, attorney
for plaintiffs in Agent Orange class action).
116 See TIDMARsH, supra note 114, at 77 ("[T]he settlement had been negotiated in
the expectation that only 60,000 claims would be submitted, but approximately
440,000 claims were ultimately filed.").
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values based on cases involving similar injuries. Indeed, lawyers have
been able to evaluate liability claims based on prior litigation involving
other products. 117 In this context, a rule or presumption against class
action settlements of immature mass tort case congregations would
bar outcomes that some litigants and judges have found superior-for
whatever reasons-to case-by-case adjudication.
A flat rule or presumption against aggregation or class certifica-
tion of immature mass torts also sweeps under one rule a vast array of
litigation types. For example, the Agent Orange litigation involved an
estimated 15,000 claims, while the felbatol litigation involved an esti-
mated 235 claims."" Tobacco litigation, which the Castano court clas-
sified as immature, potentially involves 50,000,000 claims. Whether to
aggregate these three differing litigation sets calls for different analy-
ses of manageability. Nevertheless, Castano and the MCL 3d have been
cited in support of denial of class certification in cases involving en-
tirely different sets of injuries and legal theories, primarily claims of
fraud, breach of contract, and breach of warranty
119
Other differentiating factors may also be brushed aside by a flat
rule or presumption. The nature and seriousness of the injuries will
affect the feasibility of litigating individual claims. Indirectly, Rule
23 (b) (3) calls for an analysis of the seriousness of injuries and the ex-
tent of damages. To say that immature torts dealing with modest-
117 The Castano court's holding appears to be limited to "novel and wholly un-
tested" theories. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
But the novelty of a claim may be as opaque as its maturity. See Recent Case, Class Ac-
tions-Class Certification of Mass Torts-Fifth Circuit Decertifies Nationwide Tobacco Class-
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), 110 HARV. L. REV. 977,
980-81 (1997) [hereinafter Recent Case: Castano v. American Tobacco Co.] (positing
that a "cause of action may be novel because it is based either on a new theory of liabil-
ity or on a conventional liability theory applied to a new situation" and concluding that
"the Castano claims.., were not immature in either sense of novelty... . .").
11 SeeWillging et al., Individual Characteristics, supra note 48, at 3 tbl.1 (providing
data regarding 26 personal injury mass tort congregations).
" See, e.g., Marascalco v. International Computerized Orthokeratology Soc'y, Inc.,
181 F.R.D. 331, 339 n.19 (N.D. Miss. 1998) (involving claims for breach of contract,
breach of warranty, fraud, and RICO claims by optometrists relating to marketing of
corrective vision process, and citing Castano and the MCL 3d on the issue of fairness of
class certification to the defendant); In re Stucco Litig., 175 F.RD. 210, 218 (E.D.N.C.
1997) (concerning homeowners seeking class certification for claims alleging fraud,
breach of warranty, negligence, and related claims concerning application of a syn-
thetic stucco product to their homes, and citing Castano and the MCL 3d regarding
maturity, one of many factors in the court's analysis).
'20 Rule 23(b) (3) provides that one of the factors pertinent to findings of com-
monality of issues and superiority of administration is "the interest of members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions." FED.
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sized claims, such as those relating to polybutylene piping or synthetic
stucco in home construction, should not be aggregated may mean
that such claims will not be addressed at all because the amount at
stake in individual cases may not be enough to support the litigation.
Medical monitoring claims generally involve very modest levels of in-
dividual damages or costs, yet some argue that monitoring the effects
of exposure to a toxic substance-and compensating only those with
demonstrable injuries-represents the most rational approach to
121meeting the tort system's goals of compensation and deterrence.
Another key distinction in mass tort case management relates to
whether a group of injuries arose from a single incident as opposed to
multiple uses of a single product over time. Single incidents, such as
airline crashes and hotel fires, are routinely aggregated and resolved
despite the fact that each particular incident could be called an imma-
ture mass torL' The albuterol class was linked by claims arising from
the distribution of an allegedly contaminated batch of an allergy drug.
Plaintiffs in such cases typically "share the common characteristics of
time, place, and cause of injury," and liability "is usually governed by
the law of a single forum, although damages might not be."12 When
deciding about aggregation, maturity seems less relevant than the
common features of these cases.
Similarly, factors such as the clarity of the evidence relating to
general causation, the ease of identifying the cause of an injury, the
dispersal of the cases among various courts, the number of defen-
dants, and the ability of the defendants to pay judgments all seem
relevant to decisions about when to aggregate cases. Relying on the
R. Cirv. P. 23(b) (3). In 1966, the Advisory Committee recognized that "the amounts at
stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits would be impractical." FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note. Indeed, the Castano court examined this factor.
See Castano, 84 F.3d at 748 ("[Tjhere is reason to believe that individual suits are feasi-
ble.").
1 For a summary of those arguments, see the discussion in Thomas E. Willging,
Mass Torts Problens and Proposals, in REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 48
app. C at 89-42, reprinted in 187 F.R.D. 328, 351-56 [hereinafter Willging, Probems and
Proposals]. See generally Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Fabrice N. Vmcent, Class Certification of
Medical Monitoring Claims in Mass Tort Product Liability Litigation, in A.L.-A.B.A.
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1 (July 22-23, 1999) (discussing
recent developments in class treatment of medical monitoring claims).
" See REPORT ON MASS TORT I mGATION, supra note 48, at 12, 187 F.R.D. at 301
("Litigation of single-event mass torts has followed traditional methods of aggregation
.... see aso McGovern, Mass Torts for Judges, supra note 103, at 1826 ("The judicial
system has handled, without major difficulty, mass torts involving discrete disasters,
such as aircraft crashes, building collapses, and train wrecks.").
'2 REPORT ON MASS TORT LIiGATION, supra note 48, at 11-12, 187 F.R.D. at 301.
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single factor of immaturity to rule out class certification or other
forms of aggregation elevates the general concept of maturity to a
trump card that threatens to obliterate other relevant factors.
B. Mature Mass Torts
The second proposition-that all mature mass torts should be ag-
gregated as a mechanism for resolving them-also is of doubtful merit
when viewed in the context of wildly varying types of mass tort litiga-
tion. The pressure to aggregate mature mass torts seems great, but
whether or not to succumb to it in a given context continues to be
124open to debate. The historical record has not been unequivocal;
each closed mass tort seems to have followed a unique path, implying,
in the end, that maturity is not the dominant concern.
Three mass torts remain open after reaching maturity- asbestos,
silicone gel breast implants, and DES.Iss Each of the three seems to be
following a different path. Asbestos has followed the aggregation
model at a national level via a combination of the multidistrict litiga-
tion ("MDL") process, numerous bankruptcy proceedings, and efforts
at national class action settlements.1 Silicone gel has followed what
has been called a "devolution" model.'2 The MDLjudge has provided
national leadership through pretrial management of discovery, class
settlement, and other pretrial actions (including appointment of a na-
tional panel of court-appointed experts), while leaving individual case
resolution to lawyers and judges in numerous state and federal courts.
DES cases have generally not been aggregated (aside from statewide
consolidation for pretrial management) and have been resolved over
the years in a stream of individual litigation.lss A flat rule requiring
national aggregation for final resolution would certainly have dis-
torted the path that breast implant and DES litigation has taken. In
additionjudges, litigants, and commentators are all painfully aware of
the frustrations faced in trying to aggregate and resolve asbestos litiga-
1 See generally Willging, Problems and Proposals, supra note 121, at 25-31 ("Various
commentators express varying opinions on whether and when and for what purposes
cases should be aggregated.").
12 SeeWillging et al., Individual Characteristics, supra note 48, at 3 tbl.1 (showing the
status and maturity of 26 mass torts).
'26 See id. at 14-17 (providing statistics concerning asbestos personal injury claims).
127 See generally Francis E. McGovern, Judicial Centralization and Devolution in Mass
Torts, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 2077, 2087-88 (1997) (describingJudge Pointer's decentralized
approach to managing the silicone gel breast implant MDL).
122 See Wfillging et al., Individual Characteristics, supra note 48, at 25-28 (providing
statistics on DES-related cancer and reproductive injury claims).
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tion in a single forum.
Looking at mass torts that closed after reaching maturity reveals
several more patterns. Dalkon Shield cases, involving a single defen-
dant and its insurer, have been resolved in post-Chapter 11 proceed-
ings largely through the operation of a claimants' trusL1 Several
other case congregations have been resolved through aggregated pro-
ceedings: the Bjork-Shiley heart valve and the HV blood factors liti-
gations were resolved through opt-out class action settlements;s and
TMJ implant and Bendectin cases were each resolved through a mix
of individual actions, consolidations, and limited class actions.s' On
the other hand, cases involving thalidomide, tampons, and MER/29-
all relatively small case congregations-appear to have been resolved
entirely without aggregated proceedings.'32 Swine flu vaccine cases
were consolidated by the MDL panel, but otherwise proceeded indi-
vidually through administrative andjudicial proceedings.'-"
These experiences with mature mass torts suggest that each case
congregation has unique characteristics that move it toward a unique
resolution. While there are a limited number of models, reliance on a
single model flies in the face of experience.
Let us shift ground from the historical examination of mass torts
to a more conceptual level. Despite widespread agreement with the
general concept of maturity, there are still dissenting views. Elizabeth
Cabraser, an experienced plaintiffs' class actions attorney who repre-
sented the putative class in Castano, argues that the "immature tort is
1 See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Thst, and
the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LOY. LA. L. REV. 79, 153-56 (1997) (sum-
marizing data showing that the Dalkon Shield Claimant's Trust approach worked well
at resolving claims); Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm
Lost (Or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992) (discussing the policies and proce-
dures governing the Dalkon Shield Claimant's Trust). A mandatory class action set-
tlement paved the way for consolidation of all claims and funds into a single trust. See
In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 752 (4th Cir. 1989) (approving both class certifica-
tion and a settlement order).
ISO See Willging et al., Individual Characteristics, supra note 48, at 32-33 (Bjork-Shiley
heart valve), 34-35 (IV blood factors). Note that while I classified the heart valve and
HNI blood factors litigations as "relatively mature," ProfessorTidmarsh judged both to
be "relatively immature." TIDMARSH, supra note 114, at 11. These differences may, of
course, reflect a half-full/half-empty view of the same phenomenon, but they illustrate
the difficulty of making clear and firm judgments about maturity in a given case.
IS! See Wiliging et al., Individual Charateristics, supra note 48, at 17-19 (Bendectin),
59-61 (TMJ implants).
132 See id, at 41-42 (MER/29), 57-59 (tampons), 61-63 (thalidomide).
"3 See id. at 55-57.
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an "immature concept."'3 In her view, the danger lies in "applying a
purportedly rigorous, scientific-sounding concept such as that of 'im-
mature tort'" before determining whether there is "evidence that in-
dividual litigation and trials of the plaintiffs' claims will actually be
cost-effective" for the litigants and the court system.135 Cabraser also
argues that there is no accepted objective standard as to how many
trial outcomes would constitute maturitys 6 In sum, Cabraser claims
that the utility of the "immature tort" concept is "largely unsupported
(at least to date) by any widely accepted body of evidence" or by any
consensus among lawyers, judges, or scholars.'3 7 While Cabraser em-
phasizes the practical viability of proposed class litigation, her view,
like Judge Weinstein's, seems to contemplate judges taking into ac-
count the merits of litigation before deciding whether or not to ag-
gregate.ls Other commentators advocate explicitly that courts review
the merits before ruling on class certification and that the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules adopt an amendment to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 to authorize that practice! 9
At an even higher level of abstraction, Professor David Shapiro ar-
gues for a class action model that views the class as the entity that
drives a class action. Under his model, "it makes little sense to defer
class certification of what appears to be a mass tort... until the requi-
site number of individual actions have been ground through the sys-
'" ElizabethJ. Cabraser, The Road Not Taken: Thoughts on the Fifth Circuit sDecertifi-
cation of the Castano Class, in A.L.I.-A.B. COURSE OF STUDY MATERLALS: CIVIL
PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN THE FEDERAL CouRTs 483, 450 (Aug. 14-16
1996).
I5 Id.
"6 See id.; see also David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases:
Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U.L. REV. 695, 707 (1989) (stating that the "maturity"
standard is "too vague to provide courts with useful guidance"); Recent Case: Castano
v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 117, at 980 ("[FIor the many cases in which there
is some middling number of previous suits, no objective reference exists by which a
court can ascertain the number of claims necessary to constitute maturity.").
'" Cabraser, supra note 184, at 450.
' SeeJack B. Weinstein, Notes for a Discussion of Mass Tort Cases and Class Actions, 63
BROOK L. REv. 581, 590 (1997) (arguing that courts should evaluate the merits "at
every phase of a litigation," including the decision whether or not to certify a class); see
also infra text accompanying note 145 (documenting, in an empirical study, wide-
spread examination of the merits before deciding class certification).
"9 See generally George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort
Class Actions, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 521 (1997) (arguing that mass torts can only be effec-
tively handled if courts are allowed to substantively review the merits of a claim prior to
class certification); Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death KnellforEisen: Why the Class Action
Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the Merits 168 F.R.D. 366 (1996) (same).
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tem."'4 He poses an alternative that might retain many of the benefits
of the maturity theory. Toward that end, Shapiro would certify a class
provisionally, conduct discovery and perhaps bellwether trials, and
then revisit the certification issue. Similarly, Professor David Rosen-
berg would aggregate all potential claimants who have been exposed
to a dangerous product or substance and provide medical monitoring
for all and compensation to those who develop injuries arising from
the exposure.'4 Rosenberg's approach makes the question of matur-
ity less relevant, if not moot.
Combining the above historical review with the conceptual cri-
tiques leads to the conclusion that the core propositions underlying
the concept of maturity are, to say the least, not universally applicable.
Reviewing experience with mass torts, as well as major proposals to re-
form case management practices, suggests that a hard-and-fast appli-
cation of maturity fails to address important components of the com-
plexity of mass tort litigation. Part IV will discuss some of the factors
that courts may want to consider when deciding whether or not to ag-
gregate mass tort claims.
IV. BEYOND MATURITY: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL
APPROACH FOR THE MANUAL
There are any number of approaches that might be used in draft-
ing a new version of the mass tort chapter in the ManuaL For exam-
ple, one could follow a process-oriented approach: guiding judges
through the steps that experience shows need to be taken to get a
handle on mass tort litigation. These include appointing liaison
counsel, setting agendas for Rule 16 conferences, managing discovery
processes and dispute resolution, providing for ruling on motions,
and selecting cases for trial. This Part discusses a multidimensional
"0 David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 913, 935 (1998). For further discussion of Professor Shapiro's model, see
Wiliging, Problems and Prposals, supra note 121, at 114-15, 123-24.
' See Shapiro, supra note 140, at 935-36 (noting that "an alternative... might be
to allow provisional certification of a class action when such a tort is brought to the
courts").
' Seegenerally David Rosenberg, IndividualJustice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims
in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 210 (1996) (arguing the benefits of collectivi-
zation of claims to be so complete that if individuals were allowed to choose, they
would select collectivized adjudication); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849
(1984) (proposing a "public law" view that enhances deterrence as well as compensa-
tion goals); Willging, Problems and Proposals, supra note 121, at 39-42 (discussing the Ro-
senberg proposals).
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approach, drawing heavily on work that I undertook for the Mass Tort
Working Group.14
Two related observations guide the proposition that the Manual
examine multiple factors in deciding whether or not to aggregate
mass torts. First, factors other than maturity appear to have been im-
portant forces in the management of mass tort litigation, suggesting
that there has been no single driving force. Second, mass tort case
management seems to have evolved into a number of different ap-
proaches, each representing a unique response tailored to the differ-
ent characteristics and contexts of each mass tort case congregation.
Those two historical propositions suggest that a manual cannot
provide a simple, heuristic rule-of-thumb that will guide judges in ad-
dressing mass torts of varying dimensions. This concluding Part will
identify some of the factors that courts might want to review and con-
sider in deciding whether or not to aggregate a group of related cases.
This discussion assumes for the most part that the proposed ag-
gregation satisfies the applicable rules, specifically Rule 23, for class
actions, and Rule 42, for consolidations. Case management options
are examined within the framework of existing rules.
A. The Meits
In Eisen v. CarlisleTY the Supreme Court generally steered district
judges away from examining the merits of class litigation before re-
solving class certification and notice issues. Empirical research indi-
cates that judges have found ways to avoid the full impact of Eisen,
primarily by stretching Rule 23(c)'s "as soon as practicable" timetable
for deciding on class certification to allow for prior rulings on motions
to dismiss and for summary judgment.'4 Commentators have sug-
gested a basis for that contemporary practice, namely that a court will
want at least to take a glance at the merits of the litigation before de-
' SeegenerallyWillging et al., Individual Characteristic- supra note 48; Willging, Prob-
lems and Proposals, supra note 121.
'" 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
'4 See Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical
Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challengea, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 104-07
(1996) (documenting in four federal district courts sizeable percentages of rulings on
the merits via motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment before ruling on
class certification); see also Bruce I. Bertelsen et al., Notes, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action:
An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. LJ. 1123, 1144 (1974) (noting that the federal district
court for the District of Columbia "showed no reluctance to dismiss or to grant sum-
mary judgment" without addressing class action allegations).
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ciding aggregation issues.'48 This preliminary look would address
questions such as: Can one plausibly argue that the product in ques-
tion had the capacity to cause the type of injuries alleged? Is prof-
fered expert evidence likely to be able to survive a Daubert hearing? In
practical terms, is there enough merit in the litigation to warrant the
cost and risk of aggregating the claims?47
Doubts about the merits may point toward a pilot approach, either
through ruling on a summary judgment motion or a motion to dis-
miss in a prototypical case, or through a trial of one or more bell-
141wether cases. One recent case has suggested a way of combining a
bellwether trial for statistically-selected representative plaintiffs and
extrapolation of the results to an aggregate group of claimants.' Po-
tential mass torts that have not matured into viable cases have been
rejected when judges conclude that there is no demonstrable capacity
of the product in question to cause the type of injuries alleged. Agent
Orange, Bendectin, and computer-related repetitive stress injury
("RSI") cases each failed to surmount this basic hurdle.
This approach, of course, is closely related to the concept of ma-
turity, in that the inability of a tort to mature implies a lack of merit.
The difference is that delay is not required. A court may find merit or
lack of merit in claims without waiting for an indeterminate number
of other courts to reach the same conclusion.
"4 See supra notes 138-39 (citing commentators that suggest judges take into ac-
count the merits of litigation before deciding whether or not to aggregate).
'47 Examination of the merits raises some of the same Rules Enabling Act questions
that have been addressed above regarding maturity. See supra text accompanying notes
91-98. Inclusion of this factor, however, reflects the reality of contemporary class ac-
tion practice. See supra note 145 (noting the sizeable percentages of rulings on the
merits in district courts).
13 See Robert T. Krebs, Note, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.: Class Treatment of
Mass Torts Is Going Up in Smoke, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 673, 693 (1997) ("Experience is defi-
nitely valuable, but there are other alternatives to gaining experience such as the use
of mini trials or test cases, rather than dismissing any possibility of aggregate treatment
of mass tort claims which lack a trial history.").
"9 See In re Chevron U.S.., Inc., 109 F.d 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding
"that before a trial court may utilize results from a bellwether trial for a purpose that
extends beyond the individual case tried, it must, prior to any extrapolation, find that
the cases tried are representative of the larger group of cases or claims from which
they are selected"). For an extensive discussion of the Chevron case by counsel for
Chevron, see Richard 0. Faulk et al., Building a Better Mousetrap?: A New Approach to
Trying Mass Tort Cases, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 779, 805-10 (1998) (discussing the pros
and cons of unitary trial formats for resolving mass torts and describing the Chevron
case as an immature tort).
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B. Identifiability of Causative Agent
Closely related to the merits is the ability to identify the cause of
the injuries. Some products leave a mark. Sometimes, the mark is in
the form of a signature disease that is exclusively or predominantly
caused by exposure to that product, such as mesothelioma with asbes-
tos.'o Sometimes, the mark consists of organic evidence of accumu-
lated chemical residues in the body, such as lead in a child's blood. In
both of the above examples, tracing the exposure to a particular
manufacturer remains necessary, but the identifiability of the cause
reinforces the clarity of general causation and increases the number
of common features that are evident in the litigation.
Sometimes, the product at issue is uniquely identifiable, such as a
medical device that was surgically implanted, or a drug that was pre-
scribed. In such instances, the common features of the litigation
would weigh in favor of aggregation, subject to the convergence of
other favorable factors.
C. Number of Potential and Actual Claims
The number of actual and potential claimants may affect both the
decision of whether or not to aggregate a group of cases and the form
of any aggregation. A case involving hundreds of potential claims may
not need special treatment, whereas a set of cases involving thousands
of potential claims calls for a careful balancing of the benefits and
dangers of aggregate treatment.
Class action certification under Rule 23(b) (3) requires that notice
be sent to all potential members of a class. Notification has the effect
of vastly expanding the number of claims by increasing the claims
rate, as in the silicone gel breast implant litigation.'51 The danger of
creating a mass litigation seems clear. On the other hand, consolida-
tion under Rule 42 or the MDL procedure does not involve the same
risks because the consolidation is limited to claims filed independ-
ently. Consolidations may, however, encourage attorneys and poten-
tial claimants to come forward with new claims.
150 "Mesothelioma is a type of cancer, once rare, that affects the mesothelial cells
that make up the pleural, pericardial, and peritoneal membranes enclosing the lungs,
heart, and abdomen, respectively." THOMAS WILLGING, TRENDs IN ASBEsTOS
LIrIGATION 5 n.9 (FederalJudicial Center 1987) (citation omitted).
... See TIDMARSH, supra note 114, at 77 (noting that in the initial class action of the
silicone gel breast implant litigation the number of claims reached 440,000 when only
about 60,000 were originally expected).
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Generally, the number of potential claimants represents the num-
ber of purchasers or users (and, perhaps, their immediate family
members) that were exposed to the allegedly dangerous product or
substance. While most products reach a national audience and gen-
erate hundreds of thousands of potential claims, some products, par-
ticularly medical devices (such as HIV-contaminated blood factors,
heart valves, and pacemaker leads), have a more limited use.5 2 In
large national exposure settings, class aggregation before testing the
merits of claims may invite a host of claims that are difficult to verify
and may turn out to be without merit.
D. Number of Defendants
Cases with multiple defendants add complexity to any potential
mass tort, especially to decisions about aggregation. Separate liability
decisions have to be made in relation to each defendant's product
and the circumstances surrounding each plaintiff s exposure to that
product. In addition to looking at other factors, courts will need to
consider whether the separate features of such cases outweigh the
common features. Furthermore, the number of defendants may af-
fect jurisdiction, choice of law issues, comparative negligence, contri-
bution among defendants, and, in the end, the number of substantive
legal rules that might apply.
E. Dispersal of Claims
The number of courts in which claims have been filed may have a
marked influence on aggregation decisions. Having all claims bun-
dled in a single court simplifies the choice of applicable law.' If the
claims arise under the law of a single state or a limited number of
states, the number of common issues will be greater than if the claims
are governed by the laws of many states. However, the most trouble-
some mass tort claims are those that arise from the widespread distri-
bution of an allegedly harmful product.TM Even if the claims arise
152 See Willging et al., Individual Characteristics, supra note 48, at 3-5 (estimating the
number of people exposed and the number of claims for a variety of mass tort case
congregations).
"3 See Willging, Problems and Proposals, supra note 121, at 96-99 (describing the
choice of law problems associated with mass tort litigation).
"4 See generally REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 48, at 11-14 ("Dis-
persed mass torts ... pose problems never anticipated by the present mechanisms for
resolving torts.").
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from national distribution of a product, plaintiffs' counsel may pro-
pose statewide classes to avoid some of the applicable law and choice
of law problems exemplified in the Castano case.lee In fact, this is what
they did in the tobacco litigation after Castano.'6
F. Solvency of Defendant(s)
Insolvency of one or more defendants will have a major impact on
decisions about aggregations. In such a case, the choices are generally
quite limited: some form of bankruptcy or, possibly, a "limited fund"
class action meeting the standards. 57 In bankruptcy, related cases in-
volving other defendants may be transferred to the jurisdiction in
which the bankruptcy was filed.'- To a great extent, bankruptcy deci-
sions by the parties are likely to determine the aggregation question.
G. Type of Injury
Mass tort cases have been composed of several discrete types of in-
juries: serious bodily injuries, medical monitoring claims relating to
exposure to a toxic product, and property damage claims. When
combined with the factors identified above, such claims will call for
different approaches. Generally, meritorious claims of serious per-
sonal injury are supportable on an individual basis, without class ac-
tion treatment. Perhaps they should be aggregated only as required
by the parties to provide a timely resolution of their claims.
Exposure-only, property damage, and fraud cases may need the
economies of large-scale litigation to support a fair test of the merits.
As indicated above, preliminary testing of the merits-for example, by
ruling on a motion to dismiss before deciding on class certification-
... Castano, 84 F.3d at 749-50 ("The complexity of the choice of law inquiry also
makes individual adjudication superior to class treatment.").
6 See Wiliging et al., Individual Characteristics, supra note 48, at 63 (noting that
"[a]fter the decertification of the Castano class, plaintiffi filed statewide class actions
throughout the country").
157 Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2312 (1999) (holding that
having a fund with (1) a definitely ascertained limit, (2) equitable treatment of all
claimants who have a common theory of recovery, and (3) exhaustion of the fund to
pay claims are the three criteria that are "presumptively necessary" before a limited
fund class action may be certified).
8 See In re Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 495-96 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub
nom. Official Comm. of Tort Claimants v. Dow Coming Corp., 519 U.S. 1071 (1997)
(noting that the district court in bankruptcy proceedings has the right to pick the
venue for pending claims).
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has become a common case management pracce.'59 Some argue im-
plicitly that such claims should be treated as a class because class certi-
fication itself may help to identify whether or not meritorious claims
exist.'6 Without class treatment such claims may never be pursued,
perhaps at a social cost of ignoring claims that arose out of a legal
wrong affecting large numbers of consumers. Others, of course, point
to the costs of class actions themselves and to the barriers and risks as-
sociated with determining the merits.161 Aspects of those debates arerightfully before Congress and the rules committees.
H. Latent Versus Immediate Effects
Many mass torts involve exposure to products that do not cause
immediate injuries. Their effects may be delayed for years, even dec-
ades. For example, injuries from asbestos may remain latent for up to
forty years, and DES injuries tend to only appear when the offspring
of women exposed to the drug reach adulthood.'62 Efforts to aggre-
gate mass torts with long latency periods result in the type of "sprawl-
ing" class actions that the Supreme Court struck down in Amchem. t s
In terms of the sprawl factor, cases involving medical devices or other
products that have an immediate effect, such as orthopedic bone
screws, may be more suitable candidates for aggregated treatment
than cases involving products allegedly causing latent injuries.
I. Maturity
The concept of maturity brings together a number of factors, in-
cluding some of those addressed above. Discovery should have been
completed, plaintiffs' contentions should be shown to have merit, and
an unspecified number of verdicts should have been obtained to es-
'"9 See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text (discussing whether a court
should take a preliminary look at the merits of a case).
'6 See Priest, supra note 139, at 564-65 ("There is an important affirmative role for
the class action in both the efficiency and corrective justice traditions of tort law.");
McGuire, supra note 139, at 374-75 (summarizing the benefits of looking at the merits
before certifying a class).
16 See, e.g., Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Minutes of Nov. 9-10, 1995, in 1 RULE
23 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 92, at 231, 246 (noting an argument that "with pre-
liminary consideration of the merits, lawyers inevitably will demand an opportunity for
discovery.., it will be difficult to limit its scope.").
12 See Willging et al., Individual Characteristics, supra note 48, at 17 (noting that la-
tency periods for asbestos-related conditions range from five to 40 years after expo-
sure); id, at 27 (stating that the latency period for DES is estimated at up to 40 years).
163 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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tablish the value of cases.'6 Like the factors discussed above, the ma-
turity framework sets aside the question of whether to aggregate for
discovery or other pretrial management.
As with the maturity factor, many of the factors identified above
require a consideration of the merits directly and from a number of
different angles, such as the clarity of general causation and the iden-
tifiability of the causal agent. In the end, the difference between the
approach outlined in this Part and the maturity approach boils down
to whether or not a number of trial verdicts should be required before
a case should be aggregated. That difference, in turn, leads to pro-
posing that judges systematically examine a host of relevant factors
that may be elements of maturity. Looking at the number of verdicts
and the general merit of the plaintiff's contentions is not enough.
To illustrate the difference between looking at the merits and
looking at maturity, imagine a mass tort scenario in which the capacity
of a product to cause serious injury is abundantly clear based on repli-
cated epidemiological and toxicological studies. Furthermore, the
product's use by plaintiffs is readily identifiable, its marketing and use
has been limited, and a single defendant appears to have had prior
knowledge of the product's dangers. In that scenario, postponing ag-
gregation until a number of trials have been held may be pointless.
The evil associated with premature aggregation is creating a new and
expandable mass tort, but in our scenario that is not a concern. The
merits of the underlying litigation would serve as the justification of
the suit. Aggregation is merely an attempt to control and resolve con-
sistently a large number of similar meritorious cases.
J. Exit Factors
Aside from aggregation for discovery or other pretrial manage-
ment, an important test of the practicality of aggregation involves
whether it can lead to an outcome that would terminate the litigation
without the need for individual jury trials on the merits. Can a trial
plan be devised that will address the common issues in a way that con-
tributes meaningfully to the disposition of the case as a whole? This
means more than the hope that a trial, once commenced, will yield an
aggregated settlement, or that a finding of general causation will assist
'" See McGovern, supra note 108, at 659 (noting that mature mass torts are "where
there has been full and complete discovery, multiple jury verdicts, and a persistent vi-
tality in the plaintiffs' contentions"); see also supra text accompanying notes 103-08
(outlining state-of-the-art mass tort case management).
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later juries in finding specific causation, liability, and damages. Will
an approach such as extrapolation of damages from randomly se-
lected representative cases be approved on appeall 65 Will the parties
stipulate to a procedure such as binding arbitration to establish indi-
vidual damages? Addressing such questions in advance may help
avoid piecemeal aggregation that fails to improve on individual trials
or small consolidations.
CONCLUSION
Looking back at the evolution of the Manual for Complex Litigation,
it appears that using the concept of maturity as the primary guide to
mass tort aggregation decisions (an element of the Manualfor which I
take responsibility) was out of step with the direction of the Manual.
By bundling its component factors into a single concept, maturity be-
came susceptible to the interpretation that it embodies a rule for all
cases, not a compendium of specific factors that might guide ajudge's
thinking about case management options. By unbundling the con-
cept into a number of distinct components, a revised Manual could
shift from a rule-based approach toward one in which each judge re-
ceives guidance in exercising discretion to devise case-specific man-
agement strategies. By identifying and clarifying factors relevant to
aggregation decisions, the Manual would serve the purpose of inform-
ingjudicial case management decisions and guiding the thought pro-
cesses ofjudges, without predetermining or dictating the outcome. In
this way, the Manual would serve its appropriate role as a source of
guidance and stimulation forjudges faced with the continuously novel
demands of mass tort litigation.
65 See Willging, Problems and Pmposals, supra note 121, at 43-48 (discussing the ap-
pellate treatment of statistical sampling of damages cases in class actions).
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